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Chapter One
Post-Industrial Society: An Overview

I

During the past twenty-five years or so, an emerging

body of literature has been devoted to what are interpreted
as

being fundamental changes in the nature of the advanced

industrial societies.

In general, what is argued is that the

structural characteristics which supposedly typified "indus
trial*' so ciety have undergone such radical transformation

that conventicnal modes of description have been rendered ob
solete.

As Todd La Porte has

remarked: "Something akin tc,>

the transformation from an agrarian to an induetria.l society

••• is said to be occurring within today's advanced industrial

states. n1

What we are inexorably moving towa.rds is usually

referred to as "post-industrial" society, although numerous

other labels, such e.s "post-r:.odern", "technetronic" and "post

capi talist"' have been eoployed to describe it. (more often .
than not reflecting differences in emphasis rather than in
substance).,

In this section, my objective is to provide a general
overview of the concept of a post-industrial society. I an

painfully a:ware of the fact tr..et this involves not taking into

I
i

I
i
I

I
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account tl1e oftentimes extreme differences f."unons individual

theories, in particular those which relate to the manner in
which a specific characteristic of post-industrial society
However, 2.t this point it is necessary that one

develops.

get a feeling for what is common to the literature as a whole ,.

I hope to ultimately demonstrate that "post-industrialism" in
.
fact appears as the .modern representative of a d is tinci. tra""."'
dition of political thought.

Specifically, I will argue_that

theories of post-industrial society implicitly entail what I

refer to

i1s

a. ''technocratic" conception of the bases of le

gitimate political authority.

But in order to do this one

needs to have a.t least a general understanding of the nature

of post-industrial society as envisioned by its theorists.

Before proceeding, I should admit to the reader that my

use of the term npost-industrialism" is somewhat arbitrary..

A vast array of writers have at one time or another.commented
upon the structural changes which have recently characterized

modern industrial societies.

Wha.t I take to be unique about

the post-industrialists is their tendency to view_these

changes in terms of a historical progression.

Theorists of

post-industria either proclaim that the advanced societies

have already entered a nnew era 11 , or more or le::::s self-con

sciously predict that such will be the case if present trends
ccntinue.

Writers such 2.s Daniel Bell, Zbigniew Brzezinski,

a.nd John Kenneth Galbraith obviously fall into this mold, and

it is their &.nalyses to wrtich I will primarily be responding.
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However, for purposes of convenience and illrn:.: tra.tion I will
be largely drawing upon Daniel Bell's analysis in his book,

The Coming of Po�,t-Industrial Society.

helpful approach for two reasons.

I think t:lis is a

First, at least with re

spect to the structural characteristics of post-industrial

society, Bell's account is fairly representative cf much o:f
the other literature; the o�her theorists draw upon much of

the sa�e data to support very similsr conclusions.

Seconly,

Bell is much more conscious of the problems:�associated with

historical prediction than are the other theorists, which�:.l.:.,

means that--his.apalysis,is_consideraply.more �quivocal.

often proves necessary to respond specificelly to Bell's

It

analysis in order to generalize my claims. c Hopefully,this
approach will not result in any severe injustices to the

views of the o ther theorists.

II

As we have seen, theories of post-industrial society

generally assert the.t modern industrial societies are evol

ving beyond a peculiarly "industrial u stage of development;

it is held that in some fundasentr.sl sense these societies

are entering an entirely new historical epoch.

However, the

crucial historical variable for the post-industrialists is

not the relations of producti6n, as Marx had Erflued.

The

structural ch_2racteristics of post-industria develop inde-

uendentl;y from productive relations; almost any type of re

gioe--capi tr,list, socialist or commun.ist--is compatible with

I
I
I
I
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a npost-industrial" condition.

The reason for this is that

post-industrialism, as the label suggests, specifically re

fers to a hither state of technical and eccno:G1ic development.

Consequently, technolocical change alone is thought to account

fer the salient characteristics of post-industrial society.

To be sure, Harx himself saw the forces of production as pro

viding the imnetus for historical change.

But for Nar:x: the

forces of production are historically significant only insofar
as they lead to changes in the relations of production • .:For

theorists of post-industrial society on the other hand, le

vels o:f technological virtuosity and sophistication themselves
determine historical "stages'*.

This of course explains why

the post-industrir:lists a.re so often associated with theories

of social end political "convergence".

In any case, :for the most pLrt what the post-industrial

ists ,do is to indicate how technologic2l advance has :J_ed or

will lei:2d to fundeJnental alterations in the cha,racteristic

features of industrial society.

Much of the discussion cen

ters around ti1e political, social and ethical impli c&_t io.p.s_

of new exotic technologies such as computers, instEmt commu
nications techniques, bio-medical developments 2nd the like.

Considerable emphasis is plr,ced upon such technoloc:y-ina\wed

phenomena as, for example, the heightened pace of social

change, the- increasingly immediate, though impressionistic�

nature of experience, and the privatization and de-humaniza
tion th2t ere inevitably said to accompany all of this.

-5-

We are then told of the necessity to somehow manage or adapt
to all of this.

Alvin Toffler's Future Shock is perhaps the

best ext-•mple of this type of analysis. 2 I would t-1rgue, how

ever, that focusing upon the impact of specific technologies

really serves to obscure what is actually central to most

theories of post-industrial society, although this is deci
dedly not the case with resp_ect to the imperative.for adap

t a tion and management which I will return to later.

It seems to me that one can isolate two interdependent

conceptions which in varying degrees characterize most the�

ories of post-industrial society.

First of all, it is com

monly argued that the transition to post-industria marks the

emergence of a new technical-manacerial elite which replaces
the old capitalist plutocracy.

Often ansociated with this

is the assertion that meritocratic recruitment patterns will

assume paramount importance in the post-industrie.l society.

Both of these claims are

based largely upon an analysis-of

the impact of technological adVf'nce upon the occupational -

structure of the advanced industrial societiea, particularly

the United States.

It becomes abund2ntly clear upon examin

ing the literature that the most fundemental impact doesn't

lie in the razzle-dazzle of

11

future shock n , or in the arrival

of a Mc:c1u...½.anesque ,. global villiage 11, althougp. the intrinsic
significance of the�.e phenomena is not to be der:.ied.

The-

most far-reaching effect of technological advance is much less

--

exotic. It lies in the phenomenel increases in industrial
the last centurv. 3
'1.·ch n' c.-�ve tEl�e�
·t wn
·� - .u �,
.':'1 L�. ce ouer
•
proo.' uct·
.�
,J

I
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In and of itself this is relr,.tively unimportant ,. since

the post-industrj_c1clists a.re interested in isolating some .I".eally
funde..mental change, and increasing technological virtuosity

per se ca.nnot be said to constitute such a change.

However,

technological :::�_dvance has resulted in profound changes in the

relative distribution of workers within various sectors of the

labor force, which are themselves said to be indicative of a

change in the class structure of modern industrial societi�s.
It is this phenomenon which really attracts the attention of

the post-industrislists.

Many theorists, including the post-industrialists, have

--

found it convenient to divide modern economies into three

s�s which, interestingly enough, 2re associated with. . 'the

perceived st2.ges of economic growth:

The p�.ry, secondary

and the so-called t1tertiary'• or service sector, *'comprising

trade finance, insurance and ree.l e2tate: personal, profe�siona],
business and repair services; and general government. "4

What

:-i.as happened is that increasing productivity in both the pri

mary and secondary sectors (which are concerned, respecti�ely,

with the provision of raw materials and manufacturing) has·

freed a significant portion of the labor force formerly _ asso

ci2-ted with those sectors, thus facilitating its abr::rnrption
into the tertiary sector.

To say that these occupational trends have been well

docUL.1ented is indeed an understatement.

two very tedious chapters to this.

Bell in fact devotes

But the importance of

-7these developments likewise cannot be understood in isolation,
since one cannot draw any obvt ous conclusions about the cla.ss
structure of the sdvanced societies merely from the rise of
the service sector.

After all, a good many of these jobs-

low-level clerks, typists, stenographers and the like--req_uire
little or no specialized expertise, Fnd As such lend no sup
port to the notion that this trend is somehow politically sig
nificc.nt.

What Bell and the others are really interested in

is the equally rapid growth of scientific and technical per
sonnel i;d thin the expanding white-co1ltr sector, since it is
this group which is said to become dominant both socic.lly .snd
politically in a post-industrial society.

It is perhaps most

accur&te to say, then, that the rise of the service sector is
really te..ken to be symbolic of the emergence of new bases of
class structuration.

In any case, the important thing to

realize at this point is that theories of post-industrial so
ciety are� at bottom, <:�!:����al.Ys�. ·

The question of course now arises as to precisely how

technological advance has brought about a redistribution of
politicel power.

So the theory goes, once a certain level.

of economic growth has been reached, any further increases in
productivity (_really in any types of efficiency) are ulti::nate
ly dependent upon the conscious and systematic Bpplication
of codified "theoretical" knowledee.
speci:f icslly to

Oftentimes this refers

modern oreenizational and decision-I!la-

king tecr.rnic;ues such as r.,ystems an2lysis, cost-benefit anoly
sis, progrEill'l budgeting :0md operBtions research.

Taken in its

I
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broadest

sense, however, the notion ttat theoretical know

ledge has become crucial for t!:e continued progress of the

industricd societies refers to the increasing dependence:; of
that progress upon ttpure » scientifi

research.

c�2lbr2.ith Eipells out the nature of this
book, The New Industrial StHte.5

John Kenneth

a ependence

in his

He points out that during

the e2r1y stages of indus.trial development it was not unusual
for the c2pitalist entrepeneur to effect significant advances
in industrial and orgarizational technique simply by employ
ing his own creative imagination.

This is no longer possible.

Eecause of the staggering technical complexity of even the
r::or:t rudime:nt2ry industrial undertakings, they must be subdi
vided into taeks which are amen�ble to the applicatiqn of
-orc:ctiC<'Jl ncientific knowlecge.

Building a supersonic air

plane, to cite Gr-:1lbrai th' s example, required the development
of metals which met seemingly incompatible specifications of'
weight and durability.

But this of course me&ns that the suc

cess of the overall task was 2t lea.st in part dependen� _upon
the activities of the rese�rch chemist.

Thus, although Gal

braith doesn't use the term "theoretical" knowledge, he very
definitely sees the activiti�s-of the corporation as being
ultimately dependent upon esoteric scientific techniques .,
far as I can tell, the only reason Bell uses the term
"theoretical" as onnosed to "scientific" is that he
....

l..

a oes · not

.mt to appear to be limiting himself to the natural and

�0

physic2l sciences.

In any case, the significance of all of

t�is is the same for both theorists.
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What happens is th&t the rising importance of abstract

technical and scientific knowhow is inevitably accompanied

by the rising importance of those who possess it.

Technolo

gical_ advance renders the experts or "technocrats" _functio�
ally indispensable, anci as a result they become the dominant

group not only politically, but socially as well.

u.s that•••

Bell tells

••• the making of decisions, because of the intricately linked nature of their consequences, will
have an increasingly technical character. The
husbanding of talent and the spread of intellectu
al institutions will become a prime concern of
the society; not only the best talents but the en
tire complex of prestige and status will be roo�ed ·
in the intellectual and scientific communities.

The crucial point to realize here is the.t theorists of P?�t
industriEl society generally share the view that as a._result

of the multiplying complexities of social and economic or-

---

ganization, a.11 forms of decision-making become increasingly

dependent upon specialized scientific or tecr1.nical expertise.
Consequently, this burgeoning class of highly trained

experts

--re-

eventually supplants the industrialists, business leaders,
and particularly the politicians as the group primarily

sponsible for making important policy decisibns at all levels.

As I see it, this is probably the most import2.nt characteris

tic of theories of post-industrial society1 In all cases,
the fact that technical knowled ge has itself become an indispensahle co:11modity r::1ec.ns thnt the value of traditional sour

ces of political power declines substantially.

Galbraith
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describes how the reliance upon specialized expertise works
to effectively neutralize the role of owne�ship within the
corporation.

What Bell does is to evaluate the consequences

of this phenomenon for society as a ,,,.,.hole.

No longer is po

litical power a function of ownership of the means of nro
duction.

"Class", as Bell remarks, "denotes not a specific

group of persons, but a syst'em the.t has institutionalized the

ground rules for acquiring, holcing and transferring differ
ential power and its attendant privi@es. "7

In a post

industrie.l society, these ground rules ere technical skill

as the basis of power and position, with education as the ne

cessary route of access to s-kill.

This explains why Bell is

able to argue that "the university becomes the 2rbiter of

class position" in post-industri&l society.

As was mentioned earlier, very clo$ely related to the

"new class" thesis is the notion that post-industrial soci

ety becomes increasingly chcracterized by meritocratic re
cruitment patterns.

If indeed technological advance, and the

organizational and socisl complexity associated with it,

bring:· about a reliance upon specialized technical expertise,

then it becomes incumbent upon the advanced societies to in
sure that "the best and the brightef't 11 are located in elite

positions.

We have seen that "progress/fin a post-industrial

society (defined in terms of measureable increases in any

types cf efficiency, output, production, etc.) is ultimately

dependent uuon i=:dva.nces witbin highly specialized and esoteric

realms of inquiry.
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Again, this refers not me:r·ely to the na

tural and behavioral sciences, but also to the sociHl scien

ces and cuch modern organizational and administrative tech�

niques as systems analysis and operations research •

.At any

rate, to the extent that these techniques have become ration
alized and codified, it becomes possible to determine what

specific talents and abilities are necessary to master them.
This being the case, it only makes sense to actively seek

out those persons who possess the objective "qualifications "
as measured by some sort of standardized test, s_nd to esca-

late them into functional positions commensurate with their
abilites.

Zbigniew Brzezinski states the case quite baldly •

••• the key to successful adaptation to new conditions is in the effective selection, distribution end utilization of social t9lent. If indus
trial society is said to have developed through a
struggle for the survival of the fittest, the
technetronic society--in order to prosper--requires
the effective mobilization of the ablest. Objective and systematic criteria for the selection of
those with the greatest gifts will have to be de
veloped, and the maximun opportunity for their
training and advancement provided. a

In like m�nner, Bell asserts that the post-ind us trifJ 1 soci

ety is "in its initial logic,. a meritocracy, because other

;dse it could not fulfill the requirements of the new social
division of labor which characterizes it.

By nov it probably goes without saying that theories of

post-industrial society very much represent a critique of

the r.i:ar.::dsn conceptior, of historical development, particularly
with respect to its ar;sumptions about class structuration in

-1 2-

the advanced industrial societies.

But in devel�ping such a

critique, the post-industrialists are ultimately led to form

ulate an e _l ternative conception.

This has far-reaching con

r:eq_uences for the way in vhich post-industrialism should be

interpreted, as we will soon discover.

-13-

· Chapter . Two
Post-Industrialism as Normative Technocracy
I

What I have tried to do up to now is perhaps best c�

acterized as the formulation of an "ideal-typical" post-:I:-ndus

trial society through the selective isolation of what J take
to be its essential characteristics.

Consequently, the model

I have outlined here could be used as a standard by which one

could roughly judge the degree to which modern industrial so
cieties approach or depart from a post-industrial condition.

This is indeed an important Question, and it is one to which

I will return later in this essay.

In this section, however,

I am primarily concerned with demonstrating that theories of

post-industrial society in fact represent more than the '':val..:.
ue neutral" inquiries of disinterested social scientists.

Specifically, it seems to me that the post-industrialists

are very much interested in defending the technocratic elitism
which, as we have seen, is central to their theories.

This

is not to say that they are advocates of some kind of tech
nocra.tic dictatorship.

Far from it.

But I would argue that

they see the hegemony of a scientific-technical elite as the

only rational adaptation to technological advance, and that

-14-

they express no significant regrets concerning the diminish�

ing role of politics which mus� i_nevi_tably accompany such a

ch2nge.

A charge of this nature is extremely difficult to pr.ove,

especially given the fact that some of the post-industrial

ists--this is particularly true of Bell--go out of their way

to deny that the salient characteristics of post-industria

are in any sense »inevitable", let alone necessarily de�ire
able.

The post-industrialists are extremely conscious of the

fact that their methods and categories of analysis very .c!�se

ly resemble those which characterize much ninteenth-century
social theory, particularly Harxism.

They want to avoid

seeming to engage in any type of long-term historical �redic
tion based upon the isolation of one_ social .variable, which

ie. deemed to be in some sense

0

central 0 , and hence capable

of a ccounting for all other social phenomena.

This sentiment

is echoed by Bell in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society:
I am dealing here with tendencies, and have sought
to explore the meaning and consequences of those
tendencies if the changes in social structure that
I describe were to work themselves to their logical
limits. But there is no guarantee that they will.
Social tensions and social conflicts may modify a
society considerably; wars and recriminations can·
destroy it; the tendencies mRy provoke a set of rea ctions which inhibit change. Thus I am writing
an "as if" fiction, a logical construction of what
could be •••

Use of the prefix "post 0 thus reflects what I think amounts
to a basic 2.mbivalence on the part of these theorists.

It

reflects a definite sense of having scmehow "transcended" a

II
t
I

I

I
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historical epoch, but also the realization that one c annot

define with any precision j ust what the next 0 stage n really

is . bec2.u se to do so would imply that we have no choice but

to adapt '·to its

0

objective 11 requirements.

The post-industri

c.lists try desperately to avoid seeming to fall into this

predicament.

When such an attempt is made , as is the case

largely with Bell, one is c onfronted with an almost incom

prehensible morass of contradictions.

But when it is not

mad e , the technocratic bias implicit in most theories of
post-industrial society is exposed for all to see.

- II

One is undoubtedly well-aware of the fact that techno

cratic elitism--the notion that truly legitimate political

authority derives from the possession of scientific or tech

nical knowledge--is not an exclusively modern idea, and cer

tainly is not by any means unique to theories of post-indus
trial society .

Indeed, to the extent that these theories do

in fact entail such a conception, they belong to a distinct
tradition of political thought in this respect.

Therefore ,

what I would like to do at this point is give a d etailed ac

count of the general nature, purposes and implications of

explicitly technocratic theories, drawing upon Francis Bacon,
Henri de Saint-Simon and Thorstein Veblen .

We will then be

in a much better position to determine the degree to which

c ontemporary theories of post-industrial society involve

technocrD..tic le[;itimstions.

It is reveaJ ing to note that much of what has been

referred to as
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11

classical 11 technocracy is distinctly utopian,

if it is not actually presented in the form of a utopia .

The

first modern vision of a technocratic order, Francis Bacon ' s
Mew Atlantis , is perhaps the best example of this . 2 ' This

very tentative and inconclusive work describes the visit of ·
a crew of English n a1lors to the hitherto uncharted island

kingdom of Bensalem.

What they find is a society which is

organized around the imperative for scientific research arid

technological application as described in Novum Or,ganum. · .: ··
"The End of Our Foundation is the knowledge of Causes, the

secret motions of things ; and the enlarging of the b otinds�:6f

the Human Empire, to the effecting of all things pos sible. u 3:

F or this purpose, stations for scientific research and tech

nological implementation have been set up thrOUGhout the·· king
d om .

Each one is mo,nned by highly trained specialists , 2 n�

is devoted to the analysis of any p0,3 fdble aspect of mdure "
which might eventualJ.y yield practical results .

The king-

, dom was founded hundreds of yer'l.rs ee. rlier by a man , King $ 0lc..mona ,

happy; ,

0

l·:ho cr was wholly bent to make his kingdom e nd people
The fruits of his system are manifest in " a vast

kno.wledge of the earth, air , water, animal s , fish and vege- ·

I
I

I
I
I

I

tat ion al ong 1;,ith the use:f'ul development of great r:iach:i.nes,

i'ood s, and marvelous devices of every description . " 4

The significance of Bac on ' s utopia, as with all techn o

cratic wri t ings, lies in the nature cf the relations hip be
tween the scientific-technic al snhere and politics .

And in

t
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the Eew .Atlantis the politica.l sphere, which seems t o involve
nothing more than routine administration and -, curiously

enough, religious ritual , is clearly subordinate .

Salomon ' s

House, the elaborate scientific academy j ust mentioned , and

its ruling elite clearly have been given free rein to govern

in Bensalem.

Governing is based exclusively upon the know

ledge and performance of the scientists and technicians .

However, Langd on Winner has .p ointed out that precisely how

we are to interpret this s ituation is by no means obvious ; 5�

the New Atlantis might either be a positive or a negative

utopia.

For example, Bacon does not make it clear exactly

whz the people of Bensalem should be happy with their lot,
apart from the fact that they are well provided for .

Also,

the aura of secrecy a.nd mystery which surrounds the island ,

and the vague references made to political corruption ra�s e

some questions as to how we are supposed to view Bensalem .

Nevertheless, the N'ew Atlantis does exhibit characteristi c

ally tecl1nocratic conceptions
of political power and author,_.. .�.�--·-

ity, even though doubts might persist as to Bacon ' s inten

tions .

First o:f all, political p m·:er is no longer based upon

such things as wealth , personal charisma , social status and

the like .

In an age in which the technological possibi li-

ties of s cientific knowledge a.re within reach , and hence ·__ _

where the people who underst G.nd and control the technoloc:ies

becor.:ie :.ncr·easingly indispensable to the functi oning of

- 1 8--

society, these sources of political power become mere anachronisms.

(

In te chnocratic writings such overtly "political'.t

factors, to the e xtent that they still function, are vie-d

ttc rs upon the inexorable and ultimately benign devel-

opment of science and technological syst�ms .

Political )'J O!-

e r, as Winner has remarke d, "is ultimately the power (?f na-:ture itself. " 6 Powe r accrues to those who, through the a1;>plication of the scientific method, or through the manipula

tion of the technologies which it produces, are able to cre
ate tangible be@its for mankind.

Since traditional sources

cf political power are unable to do this, they must ineyitably

be swept away in the wake of the shee r potency: of technolo
gical systems.

Such a conception of course aiso rests true

political authority, as opposed to political power, - upon en'

tirely new bases.

Authority is no longer based upon a pri.or

commitment to some metaphysical doctrine , or upon some in.:.. '
tangible personal che,racteristic.

Rather , authority is
,

l-

.

•4'

based squarely upon one's ability to produce visible results .
This is a distinctly Baconian notion, insofar as what
.

is ultimat.ely being asserted is the authority of the sciE:1+

tific method.

' ,-

Traditional sources of authority are inade�

q_uate because they simply haven't worked for the betterment

of mankind .

Their hegemony has led to nothing but endless

2 r:d inherently unresolvable bickering.

It is not re ally

possible he re to e nga.ge in a lengthy d iscourse on Bacon's

conception of the s cientific m ethod .

What is important to

l
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notice at this point, however, is that Bacon felt that sci
ence as an activity was j us tified only insofar as it led to
t he

development of techniques which obj ectively { i •.e . mater

ially) benefit society .

To be sure, Bacon held that the sci

entific method s.llows one to d iscover a ttreality tt which ex

ists independently from the observer.

But the structure of

reality itself, to the extent that the scientific method fa

cilit2tes its possible reconstruction, gives one a theoreti
cally l imitless power to act in the world .

Bacon does not

hesitate to admit that it is this characteristic which really
legitimates the a.uthority of the s cientific method , of course
at the expense of more tra diticnal forms of authority.

Tech

nocratic theories 2.lmost invariably rest upon these Baconian
premises.

Political authority, then, is really a function of tech

nical virtuosity, which is itself dependent upon the accumu
lation of scientific knowledge .

Notice , however , that since

science is justified by its unique capaci ty to produce re
sults,

.£..2.!h the so-called "pure u scientists and the techni

cians will be legitimated as rulers in technocratic theories ..
In

any c2,se , the universal prereq_uisite for acquiring poli

tical -power and au thority is functional indisnensabilit;y.

And according to the technocratic principle of legitimacy

just described, it ·would make very little s ense to make en

artificial distinction between scientists and technicians

with re spect to their relative indispens ability .

Bacon him

self d e scribes a division of labor within Salomon ' s House
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between those who engage in bt!.Sic resee.rch a.nd those who d e
cide h ow the results of this research can or sh ould be put
to use.

It is als o important to reaJ.ize that technocratic the

ories always assume the persistence of social ::::.nd political
inequality.

The fact that political authority is based upon

the acceptance of a method {as opposed to some metaphysical

of '

d octrine or world-view) does not lead to broader bas e s

political en frs.nchisement .

Indeed, as Winner has shown,
__,_...

technocratic theories form a su�ory of_��e the orf. : 1
. .

The difference between technocratic elites and other

ty;;�

of elites whose rule is legitimated by some ttpoliti cal •t .

principle (e. g . , re.ligion, natural law, contract, etc. ) 'is · ·
•

-4

":.

of course that techI1ocratic elites really do "know" some

t�ing.

The essential distinction between elite and mass

n onetheless remains.

As one might expect, the notion that

populer participa tion of any kind should play a significc.nt

role in governing is con spicuously ab8ent from tecfhocr2 tic
theories ..

To the extent that a society is d.e...nendent un� on

the cper2tion of c omplex technological systems, it is clear
that the knowledge held

by

tlle f,verage citizen or even by

his elected representatives is really unneces s ary to �eep
t ::-: e

system running .

Even in ostern,i bly

d em oc:rr0 tic

the poli t ici ;:e n bec or:1es func tion2.lly irre lev.s.nt .

ree::itY1es,

l v q uite · ela-

borate p olitic,, l " supers tructure tt might still exist , as in

Bens 2.lem 1

but in a ll cases the underlying technocrrd i c

· fl f ound ation" will be obvious .

This leads one to ask whether technocrat ic theorists are

interes ted in really legitimizing ru-le by 8}..1) ert � or whether

they we.nt to demonstrate that it is simply a hi£torical fact.
In a certain sense , this is largely an irrelevant distinc

tion .

I t is precisely because theorists of technocracy see

scientists and technicians as really being in control that

they further maintain
state of affairs.

that t his is a politically d es�)ble

The technicians , do not acquire power

Lr"'

through subterfuge , bribery or political infighting.

Neither

is personal influence , age , ideology or any other such char

acteristic of any use to them.

The technocratic theorist ar

gues t hat if technical elites have effective power in the so

ciety, then it must be because their talents are peculiarly
relevant to politics .

Even more to the point, these theo

of politics as such.

Ofte ��� a contra st is made between

rists see technical rationality or science as the antithesis

the "corru.p t tt or "ur1chaste" realm of politics , and the sub

lime purit y of science.

� . . .. <�•"·" ·-"'�

On the one hand , one finds the self

intere � or vainly ideological politic i an ; and on the other
the v,�.)i-:U�s technician.

The

technocratic theorist does not

have t o "prove" that politics ought to be the exclusive d o

main of scientific and technical elites.

Al l that is neces

s2-ry is to show that the political realm is itse lf inherent

ly corrup t , inefficient, 2nd most importantly , irrelevsn t .

Recent polit ical hist ory ought to tell us that this is by no
means t he m or, t dif'fic:.t l t enterprise.

Indeed , one need only

observe the fruitles s disnutations among self-serving '.

ideol ogues f or confirmc�ti on.
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The "authority" of t echnocratic

elites, then , i s "proven" t o a large extent b;i' negstive ex

ample .

How can t he p olitician, priest or philosopher be said

t o have ro1 th orit y if in fact t heir truly useful actions u.l

ti�ately depend up on the real knowledge of the expert ?

The

techn ocratic resp onse is, needless t o say, that they cann�t .
nP olitica.l " { i. e. , non-scientific) e.uthority is an illusion

from the start.

The invidi ous comparison of science and p olitics is n o

where m ore apparent than in the writings of two of the most
recent t heorists of technocracy, Henri de Saint-Simon arJ

Thorstein Veblen.

Saint-Simon ' s work represents a response

t o the m ost severe political upheaval �the m odern era, the

French Revolution.

For Saint-Simon , the p olitical disorder

that it engendered created a grand opportunity f or the whole
sale restructuring of French s ociety.

And the principles

upon which this c ould be based were t o be f ound in science

and industry. a

Saint-Simon felt that these f orces c ontained

within them a "logic" which ought t o govern _ s ocial arrange.:...

ments.

This l ogic involved a distinctly technocratic c oncep

tion of p olitical p ower and authority.

Society as it was

then organized was nupside d own ° , according t o Saint-Sim on .
Why?

Because t he clas ses which were least responsible f or

the mainterwnce of the industrial civilization which was

emerging out of t he Revoluti on in fact g overned.

Here again

·we encounter t he u rincinle of function as the new s ocietal
legitimation.

S s i nt-Sim on maintained t h.at an ent irely new
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s ocial l-:fe i7archy was rec1uired, based upon relative contri.bu�
tion.

""······

Those persons directly involved with the essential

scientific, economic and indus trial processes around i·rhich
s ociety is to be organized will naturally govern.

For Saint

S imon, these were the scientists, engineers, industrialists
and, curiously enough, the artists .

Saint-Simon's critique of the French Revolution , there

fore , was based upon his perception that the various .factions
involved were concerned only with advancing their pet ty ide
ologies ; their motives were excessively political : ·g,

He .fel t

that his scheme wa.s legit imate bacause it was the only one

capable o f overc0t�ling the conflict that is inherently asso
ciated with politics .

Saint-Simon did not feel himself . im-

pelled to " justify " , for e xample, the technocratic elitisfu,

lack of participation and mainifest inequality which he .free
ly admit t ed were l cgical requirements of his sys tem .

After

all, the masses would be perfectly willing to accept these

features if they exis t , as part of a system which is capable

of achieving unprecedented material abundance ..

All types

of conflict will be overcome in a society organized around

its t ruly eti sent ial purpose--the ration2.l exJoitation of na
ture in a c cordance with scientific principles .

I t is be

c2. u se the conflict of p olitical end s is s e en as prevent ing

this goal from being realized that a radical dis tinction be

tween politics and the loe;ic of scient i fic organization is

mad e .

Indeed , in technocratic theories generally . " politics"

is in eff'ect defined a:..� that which preve nts the ordering of
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s ociety accord ing to the ste.ndc.rds of technical rationality.

I t simply never occurs to these theorists that their schemes

require independent legitimation , s ince they will inevitably

-

prove themselves if only the s hackles of politics can be re-

moved.

Of course , what is to be included under the rubric "pol

itics" varies among individual theorists .

The ideas of Thor

s tein Veblen illustrate this point very clearly.

Saint-Simon

was so profoundly impressed by the sheer power and organiza

tional capacity of the industrial techniques emerging in his

day, that it just didn ' t s eem pos sible that the indi viduals
res ponsible for all of this were following anything other

the,n the "objective" laws of technical rationality .

The cap

italist entrepeneurs were to be included in Saint-Simon's

governing elite because from his perspective, the private in
terests of the entrepeneur neatly coincided with the general

interest of the entire community . (which by definition entails

the extension of technical rationality to society as a whole ) .

Veblen, however, was well-aware that this is not always the

case.

While the entrepeneur was instrumental in developing

the industrial system, he no longer performs any truly essen

tial function with respect to it.

Rather, it is the quiet

en5ineer who is now indispensable for the day to day opera
tion of the system. 1 0 But for Veblen it is not merely that

t he "c&.ptains of industry " perform no function logically re

q uired by the system , since their continued presence actually

interferes \,ith its efficient ( t . e . non�poli tical) operation .
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T o the e xtent that the capitalist entr &neur is motivated

by his greed , at the expense of a commitment to technical ra

tiontlity, his efforts can only serve to reduce output and
efficiency.

Veblen went so far as to label· the - activi:ty of

the business aristocracy "sabotage ", although this was osten

sibly a value-neutral term .

Their essentially political mo

tives prevent the realization of goals which are really in

trinsic to the industrial system itself .

But although Veblen was interested in. ridding the indus

trial system of those persons which Saint-Simon felt were

most essentia.l to it, this really repre sents nothing more

than a house-cl eaning .

Veben ' s quarrel with Saint-Simon

really serves to illuminate the ir fundamental agreement.

For both Veblen and Saint-Simon, npolitics" is that which ob
scures what would otherwise be self-evident principles ,of so

cial organization; politics is universally viewed as the an

tithesis of the community interest, which as we have seen is

defined as the rational ordering of society according to
scientific principles .

We are now in a better position, t o

understand why ttfunctional indispensability" is s imply taken

for granted as the real basis of legitimate political f!.uthor

ity in technocratic theories .

Those who are most responsi

ble for the maintenance and devE;lopment of the syste.n are by
definition

the least susce p tible to political motivations.

The principle of function, then , i§. in a sense an n ethical 11

legitima.tion of political

2.u thori ty .

Technocratic theorists
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would und oubtedly never admit to having such a view , but the

very logic of their position occasionally brings it t o the
surface in their writings .

p oint:

Veblen ' s remarks are a case in

In this two-cleft, or bi-cameral, administration of
industry, the technicians may be said t o represent
the community at large in its industrial capacity,
or in other w ords the industrial system as a going
concern ; whereas the business men speak f or· the c om
mercial interest of the absentee owners, as a b od.y
which h olds the industrial community in usu:fruct . 1 1.

This image of the technicians as s omehow c ollectively .r�s_pon

sible f or the public welfare I think partly explains why ·

technocratic theorists have often employed the m�taphor of

the priesthood when attempting to describe the special au
thority of these people.

III

The question which now beck ons us is whether or not it

is p ossible t o determine a sense in which contemporary theo

ries of p ost-industrial s ociety can be said t o entail a ��ch

n ocr�tic conception of political le�im�?Y and_ a� thor�.
"'
Based upon what has been said in the previous sections , the

answer w ould seem to be a.n emphatic yes .

As we have seen,

the p ost-industrialists argue that as a result of technolo-:
gical advance , all forms of decision-making become increas

ingly dependent upon speci Hlized "theoretical" knowlede;e .

In fact, decision-making processes themselves have become pro

gressively ra.tionalized, and to this extent now often involve
the manipulation of arcane mathematical symb ol- systems and

t echniques.
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We have also noted the rise to politi cal promi

nence of a class of highly educated scientists, technicians

and mana,sers as a result of all of this.

Post-industrial so

ciety, then, does indeed e xhibit several characteristically
"technocratic" structural features .

One is confronted with

an image of a society organized in accordance with the re

quirements of technical rationality, and in which legitimate

political authority is largely monopolized by the e xpert.

But this does not provide us with sufficient grounds f,or

asserting that post-industrialism actually represents an up
dated version of technocratic polit ical theory.

Technocracy ,

as I understand it, is fundamentally a. n attempt to establish

entirely new bases of political legitimacy.

In other wbrds ,

technocratic theorists are interested in demonf:., trating that

experts somehow ought to ·govern.

It is by no means obviousy

that theorists of post-ind ustrial society make such a claim .
V

Bel.l. , who is perhaps the most cautious o f the post-industrial
theorists, makes a point of stre ssing that he is not in any

way attempting to ttlegitimate " the rule of technocrats •
frequently asserts

. He

that "political " conflicts will not be

eliminated as a result of the increas ingly technical nature

of decision-making.

Bell takes what is an essentially Weber

ian position, in that he argues that while scientific expert.:..

ise ca.n

11

inform u political · a,ction, it alCone cannot stand as

the basis for choosing between funda.rnen-tally incompatible

value positions.

In mainta.ining such a view, Bell must con-

clude that scientists and techn icians possess no uniquely

politic2l �uthority.
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However, I will argue that the logic

of Bell ' s argument leads to precisely the oppos ite conclu

s ion.

To see why this is the case, we must examine the - na

ture of his position more closely.

IV

We have seen that theorists of post-industrial society

are very concerned with at least seeming to avoid making

any type of long-term historical predictions.

They want to

make a c le ar distinction between the ir own brand of theoriz�
ing and the predominately historicist social theories of the

ninteenth century.

There are a couple of very good reasons

for doing this, the first of course being the fact that any

attempt to "pre dict" the course of history is by its very na

ture exceedingly tenuous, an d involves considerable risk and

uncertainty.

It goes without saying that the empirical

shortcomings of l'"Iarxist history, particularly with respect

to its assessment of c lass structuration in the advanced so

cieties and the revolutionary potential of the proletariat ,

stand as a constan t reminder of this for the post-industrial-

ists.

-----�

Hore important, however, is the fact that social theo-

rizing in which historical predict ion plays a dominant role

usually has profound normative implications.

Although his

toricist theories are not c oncerned with advancing some abso

lute meta3=.1hysical doctrine or world-view, the real signifi

Q_a:o.ce of comprehending historical tt laws" is that such an un

c.erstand ing usually serves D s the basis for a critique of
the status quo .

I f one ac cepts that the developme nt of a
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p articular arrangement of so cial institutions is in any sense
inevitable, then by definition truly rational action can only

be that which is adap tive wi th respect to the predicted devel

opment.

Therefore, to the extent that the post-industria_l.:.

ists can be said to advance an historicist argument, the " val

ue-neutrality 0 of that argument is at least seriously called
into question.

I will argue that the concept of post-indus

trial so ciety does indeed rest upon fundamentally historicist
methodological assumptions.

ttHistoricism" , as Karl Popper has maintained, is " an ap

proach to the social sciences which assumes that prediction

is their principal aim, and which as sumes that this aim is at

ta inable by d isco vering the ' laws • or ' trends ' that underlie
the evolution of history. " :1 2 But the very possibility of ar
riving at such laws d epends upon further assumptions about

the nature of social organization a.nd social development �

First of all, it must be held that the various aspe cts of so

cial life are interrelated to such a degree that we may legit

i!nately refer to a social �ystem.

Se condly, one must assume

that within that system there exists an activity which is

s o,:nehow "fundamental", in that it is a precondition of the

other aspects of the system and that it is immune from t heir
influence.

This activity is in a sense the "ganglion" or

nerve center of the system, and it is held to be the central

source of change .

All chnnges in rrderivative " social a ctivi

t ies c2.n thus neve r be as s e s sed independ ently from what is

regarded as n fundamental n .
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Consequently , forecasting chan

ges in this central activity allows one to predict the nature

of the future social order more generally.

These assumptions are of course at the bottom of Marx ' s

distinction between the "foundation" and the "superstructure" .

But very similar assumptions also underlie the concept of

post-industrial society.

As ·we noted in an earlier . s e c tion ,

theories of post-industrial society are essentially class

analyses .

To a large extent the post-indus trialists are _ in

terested in demonstrating why Marx ' s predic tions concer,ning

the nature of clas s structuration in the advanced societies

have not been confirmed.

In other words, the concept of post

industrial socie ty (2,nd for that matter Clark Kerr ' s notion o:f
uindustrial" society) ,1 :'.3 is used as the basis for a critigue

of the Marxian c onception of unilinear historical develop

ment .

But in order to do this, the post-industrielis ts are

led to formulate a. rival conception, only in this case what

is regarded as "fundamental " is not the relations of prod uc

tion, but technical and economic d evelopment.

Bell as much

as ad mits this when he remarks that his purpose is " to re- 

s tore some of the informing :power of older modes of social
,t
analysis . '' ' 4

!,

That this is in fact the case is given further support

by the post-indtu} trialists' alm ost unilaterril endorsement

of the so-called

11

11
�onve rgence thesi§ .

Basically what is in

volved here is the notion that technological development
carries with it certain

11

imperatives tt which impose s tructural
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requirements up on the s ocial environment in which this devel

opment occurs.

To the extent that the advanced societies

adapt to these requirements, they will increcisingly come to

resemble one another in import ant respects.

the nature of such arguments in this way:

Winner describes

The technologic�l imperative contains a logic that
accounts for much of the way ch R.nge occurs in m odern
society . The logic is not that of syllogistic in
ference . Rather, it is the pragmatic rationale of
necessary action. If you desire X and if you have
chosen the appropriate means to X, then you must sup
ply all of the conditions for the means to operate .
T o put it differently, one must provide not only · the 
means but also the entire s e t of means to the mea.ns.f 5

At any rate , technological change require s adjustments _ in ..

almost every d imencion of social life--customs, traditi(?ns ,

ideologies, political and religious institutions--if it is t o
be successful.

But t he signif.icance of t-his is that ?-ny such

conception ultimately depends upon a distinction betwe en - so
cial phenomena which are regarded as "fundamental 11 and those
which are regarded as merely

0

derivative" .

Technological - ad

vance is invariably seen as the key variable, primarily be- ··

cause it seems to follow a· course independent of the vicissi

tudes of other. s ocial phenomena .
toricist assumptions.

These are by and la.rge his-

But as we have seen , Bell explicitly denies that eco

nomic activity inflexibly

other s oci;:-.:.1 e.ctivity.

0

determines " the characteris tics of

What allows hlm ' to s�'. th,is is a: very

-

-

neat distincti on that he makes , between the polity, the cul-

t re [?.nd the

structure .

Bell · claims that the
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distinguishing features of post-industrial society--the rise

of a technical-managerial class, the centrality of "theore
tical" knowledge and meritocracy--are characteristics only

of the social structure.

These characteristics will do no

more than "pose problems" for the other aspects of society,
the resolution of which is indeter.mine,te.

This is nothing but pure obscurantism.

First of all,

Bell frankly admits that within what is referred to as the
11

social structure", technological change is the determining

factor .

More important, however, is the fact that Bell ne

ver j ustifies on theoretical grounds why the lines between

the three spheres should be drawn precisely where they are .

This would seem to be a logical prerequisite for arguing , as

Bell d oes, that one cannot predict the impa.ct of' changes in

one social realm upon the activity of another social realm.

It seems quite app.s,rent that the " c'ulture" and the "polity"

are merely residual categories into which Bell very conven

iently lumps all phenomena which are not accounted for by

In other

technological advance within the social structure .

words , the distinction Bell makes here is essentially arbi

trary.

Bell himself implicitly recognizes this:

Conceptual prisms are logical orders imposed by the
analyst on the factual order. But since the factual
order is so multifarious 2.nd complex, many different
loeical orders--each with its own axial principle-
can be imposed on the same time or social � rame, de
pending on the que stions one has in mind . 1

At any rate , im r:iaking this distinction Bell reaps

2.

double

b enefit.
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First , he protects himself from the accusation of

having posited a unitary social system, and hence from a

charge of historicism .

But he is also able to account for a

multitud e of social chara,cteristics with respect to technolo
gical advance.

Bell's theoretical intentions are very clear.

He wants

to identify the key to overall structural change, and his ef

fort depends e ntirely upon acceptance of the idea of a so
cial system and the crucial variable .,

Besides, even if one

were to accept Bell's distinction betwe en the ree social

spheres, with re spect to the features of post-indu strial so

ciety which have been dea,lt with in t:bis essay, precious lit
tle rem&dns und etermined since they are already included un

der nsocial structure " .

-

Isolating the "culture" is really

just Bell ' s way of accounting for the "antinomian" art forms

and behavior patterns which he see s a.s acting in
to

tt�: ai1�i:'"p�irciple of the

tionality and meritocracy.

osition

so cial structure--technicul ra

As for the polity, the thrust of

Bell's argument indicates that it i§. in fact strongly influ
enced by the social structure.

The most salient character

istic of the polity in post-ind ustrial society, centre,liza
tion of authority , is a direct result of the organizational

complexity and the increa cingly technical nature of d ecision

making which are associated trith technological advance ..

mustn ' t be misled by Bell ' s convoluted argum.ent .

He too

We

s hares the assumption2 just cutlined , 2 nd a. s such must sub

scribe t o s orne vers ion of t he convergence thesis.
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If my argument is corre ct t t hen post-industrialism must

be seen as a doctrine which insists upon the whole sale adap

tation to the e xigencies of te chnologicel change and complex- ·

ity.

And if the structural characteristics of post-industri

al society are said to repre sent effective adaptations to .

such change, then there is clearly a sense in whi ch -the --post

industri::"lists attempt to "legi timize n them.

This is par'"'.' _

ticul2rly true with respec t to the incre asing importanc e of

s cientific and te chnical expertise.

Bell and company are

very much intere s ted in demonstrating that a successful. .tran;:

sition to post -indus tria depends quite heavily upon the r�

location of political power and authority in the hands of
te chnically qualified experts.

Some post-industrialists ,.

such as Donald Micha.el in his book _'.rhe Unprepared Society t
a.re quite explicit on this point.

His argument is very il

lustrative because it is more overtly polemical than 13ell ' s � ;17
The Unurepared Society largely consists of a series of e xam

ple s 2bout the management problems posed by a soci ety in

creasingly characterized by e xotic te chnologies, te chnical

decision-making procedures 2nd organizational complexity �

Michael ' s a.sse s r3ment of all of this is typically pos t-ind us
trialist.

The advanced societies should not oo lle ctive ly

evaluate the desireability of these changes .

No , to d o that

would only repre sent an immature, re;..; c tionary luddism.

In

ste a d , te chnologi c,:;.l advance should be viewed as a challen2:e

to our ability to P dap t to its require�cnts.

And the
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p er,rariive uncertainty associated 1;i th technologicsl e. dvance
most of all requires that scientific 2 nd technical knowhow
become the princ ipal sources of politic!:cl 2utLority �

At t}:is point we encounter another similarity between

technocratic and post-ind ustrit'.list theories .

The post-in

dustrialists are pc.tinfully aware. that the political hegemony

of the expert can only come thro1-tgh the effective neutraliza
tion of "political " d ecision-making criteria.

While they ,

are not prepared to argue that technical rationality contains.

within it an in.1-J.erent "logic" for the ordering of society,

the post-industriali st$ nevertheless share with the techno

crats a profound fear of the consequences of allowing deci

s ions to be based upon action-orienting world-views, faiths
and ideologies .

To the extent that existing political mech

anisms and procedures are the product of metaphysical legit
imations ( e-. g. , natural law) , they almost surely can never

react with adequate efficiency to the technological vexations

of a po.st-industrial society.

The anti-democratic implica

tions of this view are too obvious for the post-industrial

ists to ignore.

With rare insight , Brzezinski remarks that• • •

• • • the rapid pace of change will put a premium on
anticipating events and planning for them. Power
will gravitate into the hands of those who control
the information , and can correlate it most rapidly.
Our existing post-crisis mane.gement institutions
will probably be supplanted by �-crisis management institutions , the task of which will be to iden
tify in advance likely social crises and to devel
op prograrrunes to cope ·w ith them . This could en
courage tendencies d uring the :next several deccdes
tm·mrds a te chnocratic dictatorship , leaving les s
and 1e !3 s rfgm for political proce( ures as we n01-1
kno�, tnem .
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Now it is cle ar that Brzezinski and the others do not

in B,ny sense advocate a technocratic ttoverthrow 0 of libera.l

democracy .

Quite the contrary : One of the pervas ive themes

in post-industrialist theory, and especially in convergence

theory , is that one way or another upolitics " will continue

to play an important role in the future society (remember

that from the stancC'point of technocracy, npolitics 0 m�ans
the persistence of any non-technical judgmental criteria) .
This argument has a c ouple of variations.

For Michael and

Brzezinski, the continuation of politics manifests itsel� in
the need for "humanistic" technocrats.

Both o:f these theo

rists e xpress a fea.r that political leadership might just in

volve something more than being able to do a regression anal

ysis or enga�- in operations rese arch.

:Michael in fact de

votes an entire chapter of his book to the ne ed for e duca

tional reforms which will at once rid the expert of his nar
row vision and sprinkle him with a little wisdom b e sides. 1 '

But all of this represents nothing more than slushy nos tal
gia; it j ust falls flat.

If the post-industrialists were

asked to determine what is in fact more "adaptive " --wisdom

or expertise--there can be no doubt as to their eventual re

sponse .

Brzezinski's remarks tell the whole story:

The new society will require enormous tal ents--i;U3
well ai::. a, measure of nhilosophics l wisdom--to ma
nage and integrate effectively the expected cha.w
ges. Otherwise , the dynamic of change could ch� otically dictate the patterns of social change . · 2 0

The need for a type of knowledge be;yolld rnere s cientific end
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t echnic2l knowhow is, i t s e ems t o me, a n implicit recogni

tion of the fact t hs t technocretic legitimations are in some

way inac equate.

thought.

But this appears as no more than an after

Perhaps a more important variation is Bell ' s as s e rtion

that in a post-industrial � ociety, policy questions "cannot
be s ettled on the basis of technical criteria ; necessarily

they involve value and political choice s. ff ;21 Bell is of
cause echoing Weber here.

Scientific and technical knowledge

can help us determine the consequences of pursuing a speci

fic end, or the relative efficiency of various means to that
end, but it can never in and of its elf pre s cr; be ends. :;(;

Bell is quite a.ware of the fe.ct that technological and econ

omic complexity have brought about a situation where society

can no · .lo;tger afford to allow maj or decisions to be made

through the haphazard workings of the marketplace ; complex

interconne ction s ignificantly amplifie s the repercussions of
individual action, which mea.ns that the potentially da.nger

ous consequence s of such a.ction will be much wider in scope,
and hence much le� a� tolerable.

Therefore , Bell argue s , d e

cis ion-:na.king ·will increasingly become a matt er of conscious

social choice , and it will take plsce largely at the politi

cal ce nter.
in fact be

From this J3ell c onclude s that "politics" will

!!!.Q£Q

important in po::, t-industrial society.

But what is E-ell re2lly up to here , anyway?

He correctly

recogniz e s that s ince not all value conflicts can be d ecided
e xclus ive ly on t he bas is of technical crit eria , the re will

a lways be a need for theory.
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H oweve r, Bell uses this pure-

ly locigal fact/\to e scape the accusati on that he is a.n apol(t'YIJ"-f :

ogist for " crude technocracy '' , real izing full well that the

general thrus t of his 2.rgu..'!lent is the.t increasingly t echni

cized de cision-making proc e s s es severely limit the scope of
political action.

After all, the mere fact that questions

of value will always be involved in 2aking choices does not

by any mec.1.ns imply that the g�p.erP l publ�p will be able to
particip2.te in ml:'.,king those choices.

What Bell is essentially

saying is that the hegem ony of a.n elit e corg� of t ech:nici�.:. n s

a.nd scientists is in fact a :p re requisite for maintaining g_n.z

role a t all for political theory .

is scarcely conce aled :

Bell's t echnocra t ic bias

The shaping of conscious policy, be it in foreign
p olicy, d e fense, or economics, calls to the fore
the men with the skills ne cessary to outline the
c onc traints ahead, to wo rk out in detail the man
a.ge,:ent and p olicy procerl f fr- es, and to assess the
c onsequences of choices. 2 2

Somehow, even Be ll's acknowled gement of the ne ed for theory

doe sn't n,ake much sense in the c ontext of hi£-'. overctll argu

ment.

A political theory usuc.illy involve s a conception of

what is to c ount as legitimat e p oJitical authori ty.

But it

is obvi ous t hat the 2.uthority of the scientific r1nd t echnical

intelli:entsi2 will neve r be challenged by " t heory", regard

le ::-; s of Low lor;icalJ.y necc :, s ::: ry it :c1ay be .

The fr1ct of· t he

mat ter is tha t De ll , l ike the other pos t-ind ustrialis ts, sees
the � ranscendence of the old cepit ali s t plutocracy by t he
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scientific and technical intelligents ia as a necessary adap

tation to technological adv,:1nce .

This is further substantiated by the fact that the post

indus trialists do not even attempt to d isguise their support

of the merit princ�.

As we noted in the first chapter,

"me-ritocracy•• denotes a social order which is committed to

the escalation of all citizens into functional roles which
are c ommensurate with their natural abilities .

Meritocracy

has trad iticnally been regard ed as the logical outcome of a

situation in which true equality of opportunity prevails, and

conse quently has been defended primarily on these grounds .

The idea is that functional roles, and the differential rewards 2 nd privileges e�ssociated with them, ought

_.!19.1; to be

distributed on the basis of arbitrary and fortuitous

person

al characteris over which the ind ividual has no control .
T1,s

Rather, a social order is regarded as just only when these

things are based upon characteristics which are in some sense
"natural".

In a pure meritocracy, such as the one d�scribed

by r,Iich-�el Young in his fa.ntasy, The Rise of the Meritocre.cy ,

natural characteristics are usually unders tood to be genetic. 2 3
it is obvious that gene tically based tra its are as arbi�
�
trary and hence undeserved as anything else, so the notion
C\.S

that a meritocracy can be described as u just 11 quickly evap o ...
/\

rates .

I ndeed, as John Schaar has pointed out, equality of

opr:,orttmi ty ( and hence the merit principle) is inherently un

intelligible as an indeuen&ent princip le of justice . 2 4 �he

concep t of distribut ing functional roles end their a ttenc c:mt
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p ri viliges on the c:,a,� is cf me rit rn2.k �1 s no me nse unle s s ws

have already defined ahe2d of t ime what abilities are t o te

regard ed as valuable.

We have Geen that G , ' ientif'ic .:� nd technical expertise

are highly valued by the n est-industrialists, and their de

fense:- of meritocracy

rests largely upon the fact that it . is

a use ful tool for the identification of individuals who pos

sess the natural ability to acquire these skills .

words,

I n other

meritocracy is itself defended an an indispensable

mechanism for the effective adaptation to technological ad ".""

vance and t he problems associated with it .

One should refer

once ;:,gain to the pas s age by Brze z inski cited on page eleven
1
since he is quite cand id on this point. It is certainly ob

vious that there are no " systematic criteria" available for

the d eterm ination of int angible characteristics such as wis
dom or experience .

A commitment to merit ocracy, the n, neces

sarily entails a previous commitment to the development of

skills which rely upon neasureable _ talents .

Neritocra.cy is

the me thod of politicnl recruitmenf�which is most consistent

with a political system in which legitimate authority is held

to be a function of technical expertise.

The logic of this

positi on actually leads the post-induntriElists t o occas ionait�

ly conpare the authority which derives from scientific and
technical expertise

with more traditional forms , cle::::.rly

expor dng their technocre.tic bias.

Notice Bell ' s use of the

word " leaderi:;hip 0 .L in '- the . if olloirin5 pas s2.se :

(
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• • • there is :no reason why t he principle of meri
tocracy ::o hould not obtain in business and govern-,
rnent as well (as in the univer sity ) . One wants
entrepeneurs and innovators Kho c��n expand the
amount of prod uctive wealth for society. One wants
men in political office who c an .9:overn well . The
quality of life in any society i s determined , in
considerable measure, by the quality of leader
ship. A society which does not ha.ve its best men
at the head if its leading inst�!utions is a s o
ciological and moral absurdity.

In summary, I have attempted to indicate a sense in

which post-industrialism can be said to entail a. technocratic

c oncepti on of legitimate political authority.

While the

post-industrialists do not .:--:s r�ue that the hegemony of a scirequired by the
-------

entific 2nd technical elite is "logi

scientific method or ind ustrial technique, they do see it

as a neces sary ad:::,.pta.tion to the exigencies of technological /

change.

It is for this reason tho t it is legitimate to view /

the post-industrialists 2.s contemporary spokesmen for
tive technocracy.
----.._,

n�-1

But this is true in even a more funda-

mental sense, as we will see in the next chapter.

/I

I

I
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Chapter Three
Nornative Technocracy:
An Analysis and CritiQue

I

By now it should be fairly clear that contemporary theo

ries of post-ind ustri2 l society entail what really amounts

to a, technocratic le6itim2tion of political authority �

In

a n age incre asir:5ly characterized by unmanageable organiza

tional complexity , technological virtuosity, and abstruse de

cision-making techniques , governing must of necessity become

primarily the realm of the expert.

would lead to nothing but chaos.

Any other arrengement

Acceptance of some "objec

tively u valid doctrine or world-view, or even of a.n ideology

which merely sanctions the open c ompetition among subjective
interests , can o.nly und ermine our capacity to adapt to the

requirements of technological change.

Our very survival ,

then, d epends upon our recognizing thn.t scientists and tech

nicians ought to be accorded political c�uthority .

At any

rate, thia is whet t he post-industrialists woLld have us be-

· lieve.

In t his secti on I will r'ttempt to formulate a criti que

of pos t-ind ustria l i sm bas ed upon an 2 nelysis of the norma

tive implica tions cf th� t echnocratic mod e of political

Jl.er;i tima t i cn .
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It must be c.• dwi tted here thr, t even thcugh

p os t-ind ,_: s tri2 lism can be r�ee:n es a m od e rn rep rer: ent ative of

technocratic thought, a cri ti que of technocracy in a paper
ostensibly devoted to the orie s of post-industria is , in a

sense , c ontrived .

The read e r may very well obj ect t o my ha

ving d evoted s o much space t o the p ost-industrialists given

the fac t that my ultimate object of condemnation is normative
t e chnocracy .

I am prepared t o offer only two re s p onses to such an ob

j e cti on.

:Pirst of all , it is often assumed that techn ocra

tic id e ol ogy (make no mistake about the fact that it is an

ide ol ogy) 6.ied along with H oward Scott ' s crackp ot organiza
tion , Technocracy , Inc. 1

:Normative techn ocracy strikes the

m odern reader as being extremely na.ieve and simplis tic .

To

my knowledge n o s erious p olitical the orist in recent years

hc�S ever suggested that scientifi c-technical knowledge con

t ains within it l ogical "principles" f or the ord e ring of s o

cie ty.

Even the p os t-indus trie. lists d on't g o this far .

Therefore, my emphasis up on the p ost-industrialis ts i s inten

ded t o dern ons trc:t te tha.t the implicit assumptions, goals and

biases of technocratic ide ology are .still very much present.

Second ly , my critique of technocracy inv-olves not only exam

ining the bases o f technocratic legitimati on, but also the

p oliticr:: l conseq uences of a s ituation in which such a m od e of

legitir:1r, t i on actually pred ominates .

It s e ems to me that

the ori es of p os t-indus tria, ins ofar cG the y are primarily em

piricc1,l c:nalyse s, r:� re th em:=; e lves quite reve aling

a2.

t o wh2.t

these c ons e c; ucnce s

be.
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The most striking feature of technocr._.:i tic theory is its

incredible SCTugness.

As we noted in the preceed ing chapter ,

technocratic theorists such as Bacon and Saint-Simon felt n o

need t o invoke some metaphysical principle to "legitimate "

the authority of the scientist-expert.

Again, the reason is

that for these theorists traditional modes of legitimation

lead to nothing but intellectm:tl, and hence political, chaos.

The "political 0 realm is implicitly understood to be that

which obscures the otherwise self-e-vident principles of so-:

cial organization, as embodied either in the scientific me
thod or the

11

logic 11 of industrialism.

Technocratic theorists,

then, envisioned what really amounts to the historical tran
scendence of politics as such.

The new technocratic order

needs no independent legitimation, because it is the insti

tutional embod iment of the public good.

I t by definition can

not be j ustified on moral grounds, because it is precisely

such concepti.ons ,,,hich prevent the new order from being real-

ized.

Froiil a strictly logicc":i.l point of view, technocratic le

gitim2.tions appear to be .wholly untenable.

It j ust doesn't

seem pos sible to argue tha t all world-vi ews, ideologies, re

ligions and philosophies which mc=, ke cl2.ims with respect to . ul
timate er:.ds are nothing hut "illu:::ions " , and yet maint 2.in

th2.t t echnicG l re:, tionc�lity c ont e ins e lo<ic which oup�ht to

govern social c:1rr,J nge::1 ents.

This kind of c.rEurnent, ho·wevcr,

\
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m akes much more c. cnse if we take into consid erc, tion the char
acteris tic bias es n nd goals of technocrr•tic thought.

It is abs olut ely crucial to remember that technocratic

theoris ts vie w tra.d i tione.l more.I or me taphysical conceptions

of ul tim.ate ends a.s having prevented mankind from understand

ing the truly n essential 11 purposes of

2..ny

society . c· ..:..:For ex

ampl e , a confirmed technoc_rat would regard as obscurantist

any debate over the relative merits of political e 'luality or

inequality if it was assumed that either one must be shown
to have intri nsic value.

The " worth" of a.ny particular so

cial component can only be understood in light of its util
ity in bringing about a condition of material abundance , or

in Hobbes ' words , '*commod ious living". Technocratic theorists,

especially Bacon and Saint-Simon , exibit an astonishingly

na,.ie)re optimism in assuming that if only it were _possible to
strip away all ot · our uniquely npolitical n conceptions, the
i.___.,/

truly essential function of any social order--provision of ·-;.�- .'.-..�_:;
,,

the good life--would become universally obvious.

If one stops to think for a moment , an attitude such

as this is not really all that aif'ficult to sympathize with•.

After all , do we not express similar sentiments when we vent

our wrath against the "petty politics" -which , for e xcJnple ,

results in farmers beirY:j paid not to produce , or for that mat
ter whenever we perceive that basic human needs are being ne

glected for "political 0 re asons?

What I ' m trying to get at

here is that all of us sh2re a perception that material existence is somehow basic.

There is u...Yldeniably a sens e in
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which providing an adequate material existence is l ogically
u prior 1t to other aspects of social life.

But what the tech

nocr<'i.tic theorists do is to raise · this need almost to the le

vel of an ethical imperative, although they certainly wouldn't

describe it as such .

This is not to say that technocracy i s

an ideology of crass hedonism, although I will later argue

that this is the £_ractical basis of any technocra.tic legiti

mation .

The te chnocratic theorists simply felt that the ma

terial lot of all men could be substantially improved through
the systematic application of the scientific method .

If _tllis

were accompli shed, the masses would immediately recognize

the e ssential irrelevance of politics .

I ntima.tely associated with this emphasis upon material

abundance is a profound yearning for inte llectual a,nd

tical order

oli

This is of course a frequent desire in Western

political theory, but it is perhaps even more basic t o tech
nocratic theory .

To see why this is the case, it is quite

use ful to contrast the technocra.tic outlook with that of

Hobbe s, who was certainly very much intere sted in e s tablis�
ing a stable politi cal orc er .

Hobbes , as did the technocrats ,

recogni zed that poli tical order is d epend ent upon int e llectual

order.

The bas i c problem for the sovereign , then, is to - �r

rive ::-1 t a set of conceptions upon which everyone could agree .

If we can arrive at static definitions of our conceptions ,

then it will be logically impossible for persons to acquire

notions which are at odds ·with those upon which the legitima
cy of the state ir.:; b£�sed.

To this end, Hobbes proposed the
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a doption of a science of politics .

Through use of the prop-

er methods, it would become possible to neutralize the biases

which prevent agreement upon - def initions of politic-al con;.. · ·

cepts.

The Leviathan is essentially a collection of such de�

finitions .

Hobbes of course tried to maintain that his definitions

were objectively correct , but he admj_tted that the proof ul

timately rested with their usefulness to the sovereign in .
creating an orderly state.

In other words , if Hobbes were

pressed on this point, he would have to admit that his scien
tific method results simply in an agreement upon one bias,

the "objectivity" of which depends upon the sovereign enfor

cing it .

In technocratic theory, on the other hand, order

i s not a political characteristi c , �.nd does not come about

Indeed, .•.

through any agreement upon political conceptions .

recognizing that order as such (or for that matter any other

moral or political imperative ) is of no intrinsic value:·rs 'in

fact a prerequisite for the existence of a truly staQle social
order !

For the technocrats, so cial order is the natural and

spontaneous outcome of a situation in which "politics 0 has
been transcended.

Order is not artificial ; it is not some

thing which we have to create, as it is for Hobbes .

felt that conflict had to be suppre ssed.

thought, the need for order is

even

Hobbes

In technocratic

more basic since it ap

pears as the truly nc.,tural condition of mankind .

Order is

not fragile, precisely because it is not created by political

means .,
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All of this, again, i s l argely intended t o show that

there � certain preferences or biases which are basic to

technocratic theory.

Taken as a whole , they might be said

to constitute what_ I . will refer . to . as . the technocra.:tic . !!.im

pulse 0 .

:But the technocratic theorists certainly did not .

vie w their predilection for material abundance and political ·

order as nothing more than a simple pre j udice.

From their

of an ob j ectively efficient technocratic order.

For theo

perspective, these are simply the defining characteristics

rists such as Saint-Simon, stability and abundance would in

evitably come about if only society would recognize that sci

ence and industry entail a " logic 0 which ought to govern s o
cial arrangements .

It seems to me, however, that the tech

nocratic theorists were so overawed with the seemingly lim

itless uotential for material and organizational progress

latent within thes e forces, that they assumed that by merely

stripping away the political restrai.nts upon them, mankind

would spontaneously recognize the truly natural or e ssential

mode of s ocial orgainization .

More importantly, they assumed

that because a technocratic society would be judged on the

basis of its efficiency, and not on political or moral cri

teria , it d id not require a standard moral legitimation.

TechfiOCr&tic theorists i n effect posit an "end of history" ,

a period in which ethical categories no longer h&.ve 2ny mean-

ing.

It is isportant at this point to distinguish between
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two meanings of the term legitimacy. 2

On the one hand,

there is the modern socic:.1-scientific conc-e -p tion, under which

legitimacy is seen a.s a. condition of political acquiescence.

Here, legitimacy is rooted in the public ' s acceptance of the

existing political order.

Traditionally, however , legitimacy

has been regarded as describing a condition of moral entitle

ment.

I t is u.."1.derstood thz.t a set of political elites in

fact has the right to govern .

technocracy can

I would argue that normative

j

be said to entail only the former conception . \

I t may very well be the case that a society, c ollectively or
ganized for the purpose of m.aterial advc'.nce in accordance

with the highest standards of technical efficiency, would ex

hibit considerable politic2l stability .

After all, with the

exception of the ninteen-sixties, post-war America has done
pretty well for itself .

But how, after all, can n1egitimacy n

in this sense be regarded as anything other than a form of

-collective briberi'?

While t.he public in a technocratic or

der would undoubtedly be willing to accept the rule of the

scientists and the engineers, this fact alone is insufficient

to justify the claim that their hegemony is truly legitimate
in the traditional normative sense.

then, the people must be bought off.

In technocratic theory,

This raises some questions about the technocr,:.tic no-

tion that politice.l order s omehow naturally and inevit ably
accompanie s the d evelopment of a technocratic sod iety.

Of

course, order res ults from the e limin2.tion of c.onflict, and
the te chnocrats see this , i2 turn, 2.s arising out of the
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c ollecti ve ree.lization of man..'J.cin6. ' s n esE:ential n purpose .

But the technocrats seem to be v..n ea:::dly aware of the fact
that tr:e public ' s obedie nce is not re:=.;.lly based 1..1.pon any

sense -tof reverence or respect for legitimate political au

thority.

They also seem to recognize the underlying fragil

ity of a. system in which these se ntiments are absent.

I f :. .:

this were not the case, there would seem to be no reason for
the inclusion of elaborate politico-relic;ious :facades in

much technocratic theory.

It seems clear, for exa..�ple , that

Saint-Simon ' s "New Christianity" really amounts to a sJlbz:ti

tute progr2.m for the purpof�e of cementing the people's loy

alty to the system (i. e . , for creating legitimacy in the so
cial-8cientific sense ) . 3

But realize further that since

such politice.l fac2. des c'.re b ·,,.- definition non-essentiGal, then
the one pos sible basis the technocrats may have had for

claiming that their schemes result in morai legitimacy quick
ly evaporates .

To be sure , tech..."1.ocratic theorists attempt

to dispense with moral categories entirely by positing a har

mony of fact and value in a. technocratic order.

But if the

underlying assumption of .:;_n essential social activity is

n ot exactly a nmoral n conception, it mus t be admitted that
it at least . functions as the technocrr!.tS' rationale for

claiming that scientific elites s omehow nought" to govern ,
end that their authority is legitimate.

This rationale is

l::.;_rgcly underuined by the technocrats ' ad::1ission

that some

thing non-e r sential to the productive process as such is ne

cess 2i ry in order to insure public acquiescence .

Somehow
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e ven the technocrats are aware that the term 1egitimacy :_"

falls flat when it is used to describe what is n othing m ore

than collective social indulgence.

IV

l

So what , then , is my criticism of the technocratic mode

of legitimation"i

Is the problem that scientific knowledge

is inherently incapable of showing us how social life "ought"

t o be arranged, and that as a result the technocrats simply

fail to offer a traditional m oral legitimation of p olitical
authority?

Alth ough J _will try t o demonstrate that this is

ind e ed the cas e , my obj ection t o n ormative technocracy goes

s omewhat deeper than this .

A c onsid erable amount of time

has been spent here in examining what I take t o be the im

plicit value assurnptions of technocratic theory.

It is only

whe n we recognize these as values that the technocratic

claim to have disc overed ob jectively efficient principles
of s ocial organization makes sense.

But what I find s o dis

turbing ab out technocracy is that its ultimate reliance up on

the authority of science as a principle of legitimation in

fact leads t o a situation in which the technocratic ttimpulse"
will as sert itself m ore readily.

It seems t o me that technocratic th ought cannot really

be fully understo od if it is only viewed as a political theo

ry.

It is very tempting t o dismis s n ormative technocracy

entirely once it has been d em onstrated that science l ogically

c2.nn ot e xp ose

1

t

principles " o f s ocinl organization.

H owever,

an incre asing reliance up on the authority of s cience tends

'
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t o undermine all nrnetaphysical" doctrine s as such.

It is

not merely that s c i e nce alone cannot legitimate a specifi- -

cally technocratic orde r.

The incre asing prestige and au

thority of science, because of the necessary separation of
ufact" a nd "value 11 which is associated with it, systemati

cally removes any possible basis for a truly moral legiti

mation of a social order .

" Technocratic consciousness n , ac

c ording to Jurgen Haberm2.s, "reflects n ot the sundering of

an ethical situation but the repressi on of ' ethic s ' as such
as a category of life. " 4 I will argue that given a w orld in

which the reality of tr2nscending objectives is denied , tech
nocratic values will appear to be the only "rational" one s .

Be f or proceeding with this analysis, however, lets dis

pense with the technocratic notion that it actually is p os
sible for science to prescribe values .

This is s imply in

consistent with the logicel d istincti on between fact and

value.

Normative technocracy is wholly dependent up on the

assumption that there is indeed an "optimal" pattern of s o

cial organization, and that scie nce can tell us what this

is.

The fact that theorists such as Saint-Simon and Veblen

disagreed as t o what is to be regarded as "e ssential " t o

the system itself suggests that norms of efficiency al one
cannot function es the basis for a social order.

Ends,

which are either defined by subjective interests or pre
scribed by a system of values, are lordcally " prior tt t o

means .

There can be no doubt that scientific knowledge can

provide 2.n exce llent wa,y to deternine the best means t o

X

achi eve a given end.

- 5 3-

But s c ient ific k n m·rled ge, h owe ver con

ce ived, can never tell us wh2t ends are worth achieving.

Na.x Weber perhaps expre s ses this view the most consistently :
• • • the scientific treatment of va.lue-judgments r':!.ay
not only understand and empathetically analyze the
desired ends • • ; it can also ' j udge' them critical��
ly• • • i. e . , it can be no more than a formal logical
j udgment of historic2:.lly given value j udgments and
ideas, a testing of the ide as according to the pos
tulate of the internal cons iste ncy of the des ired
end • • • The elevation of these ultimate standards ,lill,
to the level of explicitness is the utmost that the
scientific treatment of value-judgments can do with
out entering the realm of speculation. As to whe
ther the person expressing these VElue j ud6111ents
should adhere . to these ultimste standards is his
personal affair ; it involves will and conscience ,
not empirical knowledge. 5

The legit imacy of a technocratic order re sts upon the

assumption that all distinctly "political" influences c an

be eliminated, although it must b e admitted that this is not
so much the ca.se for Bacon as it is for Sa.i nt-Simon and Ve

blen.

But the logic of the technocratic ·position leads to

the conclusion that all ends as such c-re political , since i t

is obvi ous that no p;_� rticular end or purpose i s inherentl y
" e ssent i r! l " to a collect ion of techn.ological rri e2ns .

Veblen

though that he had succeeded in demonstrating that the in

dustrial s ociety o:f his d 2.y could be e ffectively "purgedtt

b:r s imply overthrowing the cap tains of i ndustry. · There can
be no doubt, however , that his d ecisi on to stop at this

point is e s s enti ally qui te e rhitrary.

Al though t··: i s cri ti c i sw I think e f'fecti vely unde rmines

the techn ocratic claim to have e stablis�ed the bas i s for p o-

l itical led i timacy ir, the :ncrs2 t i ve �, e nr:.e , whet I b ave called

t h e t e chrlO(�r�=�tic
s ult .

0
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impulse" d.oes not j us t disappear as a re

Technocre cy as a, poli ticc�l theory may not be inter

nally c oherent, b ut the temot :don to employ scientifi c me-

conflict , e stablish politi-

thods in order t o su�ss

cal f;tnbility, and in general brinr; about the prerequisitea

for " commodious living 11 , is in fact Btronger now than ever
before.

There ere obviously many p ra ctical reasons for

this, sorae of which "'1ere alluded · to in our discussion of
post-ind ustriD lism.

I need o:1ly re peat here the post-indus

trialists g neral argument that technological advance has

created a world so cor1plex and interdependent that the po

tentielly destructive cons eciuences of individual action are

too gre at to allow traditicmal mod e s of decision-making to

perpetuete .

But I also wa nt to argue that there is an intel

lectual and mor,.::.l basis for this tt resurgence" , as it were,

of the te chnocratic impulse .

I n making this argument I should first point out that

I am heavily ind ebted to �iax Horkheimer's analysis in his

E clin s e of Reason.

Since my argument is largely an extension

or Horkheimer's, it is convenient at this point to summarize
his position.

I f I am not mista..1.cen, reason in general can

for Horkheimer be des cribed

2�S

ables one to a ct effectively.

any form of knowing whi ch en

However , there are two cate

gories of reas on, the ob j ective and the subjective .

Objec

tive re ar; on has to do with ;nap...kinds c2,pacity to understand

how he ou,;zht to act.

It e,ssumes the e xistence of a prin ci

ple inherent in re2.lit;y fr om 1,hich man c2.n derive a

-5 5-

conception of human destination.

In other words , obj ective

reason denotes the perce?tion of a Truth which renders in
telli5ible our existence.

Subj ec tive rea son, on the other

hand, is concerned with evalue.ting the adequacy of various

Subjective reason does not ask whe

means to a given end .

ther or not ends themselve s are reasonable .

taken a s givens. 6

They are just

Originally , according to Horkheimer, these two concep

tions of reason were able to coe xist , but what has happened

is that over the p ast several centuries the subjective con

ception has gradually won out over the objective.

The possi

bility of describing an object, concept, or purpose as being
in itself inherently "reasonable" has been severely under

mined.

Rectson , correctly understood , can now legitimately

refer only to a certain faculty of the mind which is used
to coordinate mec:.ns with ends.

An object ca.n be said �o

have "value " only to the extent t:t'.:la.t it is useful in the re
alization o:f previously · defined ends :

In the sm.bjectivist view , when ' reason ' is used to
· connote a thing or t'.'-n idea r:cJ ther than an act, it
refers exclusively t o t he relation of such 2.n ob
jec t or c oncept to a purpose , not to the obj ect or
concept itself. It means that the thing or idea
is good :for sometl- ing else. There is no reasona
ble aim as such, :::0.nd to discuss the Gu p e r i ori ty of
one aim over e_nother in terms of reason become2
me2ningless. 7
1

But if it is held th2.t it i s no longer possible to 2.rrive
at a r, e t of absolute principles by which we can judge the

value of r:omething, 2-,ll philoso:s-,hical categories, including
"man" himself, become m ere phenomena to be clas sified .

- 5 6-

Nothing is autonomous, since everything is looked upon exclusively as a means .

But what e.re the prc:"-ctical cons equences of a situation

in which the pos sibility of knowing an ultimate Truth is

categorically rej ected?

Nha:t happens _ is . that subjectave

reason, which accepts as truth {i. e. as

11

:fact tt ) only scien

tific knowled ge, becomes subj ect to the vicissitudes of com

peting interest s.

Since reason is now only a faculty for the

classification of data, there can be no obj ectively valid
limits placed upon the ends which it will serve.

One value

is as reaoonable s.s the next, since there is no rationa.l

agency authorized to appraise and link vari ous ends to an
obj ective reality:

Having given up autonomy, re ason has become an in
stru..� ent . I n the formalistic aspect of subjective
reason t stressed by positivism, its unrelatedness
t o objective c cntent is emphasized; in its instru
mental aspect, stressed by pragmatism, its surren
d er to heteronomous contents is emphasized . Reason
has become completely harnessed to the social pro
cess . Its operational value, its role in the domi
nation of � en and nature, has been made the sole
criterion.

In other words, the subjectivization of reason furthers the

development of ethical relativism .

All ends, whatever their

conte nt, are simply accepted as raw data, as givens .

Since

no narticular end c::m b e s2-id to b estow· meaning upon our ac

tions , t here is no lor;ical reason why any end can not serve
a s a legitimete inpetus for action.

Of c our::., e , the ultim:-c.te cP,use of 2.11 of this h2,s been

.
.
.
a:no., e.ut'nori. ty
preE, t ir;e
the 1.ncreas1:ng

OI�

t'ne sci. en .._1., l. +J. l. C

t'nwI .,

N-, 'l.
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As we have seen, even though the scientific method was ori
ginally justified on the b asi s of it s ability t o provide

" fruit s n f or c ommodious living, this fa.ith was itself based

up on the assumpti on of an inherent order in natsftute which is

n ot man made.

H owever, in pre-m odern systems of thought in

which the objective c onception of rec. s on pred ominated, real�

ity in this sense was understo od t o be only a part of ua c om

prehensive system of' heirarchy , or e.l l beings, including man
and his aims. n9 I n objectivism, ree.lity (i. e. , the natural

world and the relations among humc.n beings and between s ocial

clas ses ) was identif'ied with Truth and g oodness, and it was
felt th;::: t an an2lysis of reality could only reveal this
Truth.

However, the original s p okesmen f'or the scientific

method euch as Bacon and Descartes, were quite 1.,mawa.re that

since science is capable of only a classification and descrip
tion of the elements of reslity , its acceptance as the only

le£;itimate form of knowing would inevitably lead t o a denial

the.t by understanding re2lity one can arrive at a Truth which

someh ow m;::1 kes reality meciningful.

In other words , the rela

tivistic implications of the feet-value d istinct i on were

f or a long time unapprecL1ted.

At any rate , given a situation o f t otal value-relc: t ivity,

H orkbeimer p oints out thcd the only n oris ible "authority n

which re:;::ains is s cie nce.

E orkhe irier does not mr:ke the mis-

toke of bar; ing t l-.,.is ccnclusi on up on the os tcn:::d 1)le nvalue-

neutr::0.li ty" of scientific inq uiry, or up on the as sump t i on

that r:1 e t�rnd renll v cen ezp o[�,e

::c.

re,Ili ty which is ind ependent

.. .I

I
I

II

l

I
i

I

!!

¼
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-

-

--

-

-

-
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S cience i s c� n authority be cause it enhan

ces our capacity for subj ect ive reason--that is , it is an e x

tremely useful tool for helping us get what· we wa.nt .

It real

ly makes no difference whether or not there is a.n inherent

order in the natur al . a.nd_so cial world, or whether it is pos 
sible to remove all b .i ase s whi ch interfere with our capa.ci ty

to understand that order by employing s cientifi c methods .

It i s enough that a belief in the s e things enhances one- ' s

power to act i n the world.

Where, then, does this leave the technocratic mode of

legitimation·� particu.J.:.arly · '-s · it finds. ex:pression: in theo
rie s of post-industrial society?

First of all, it is cle ar

that to the extent that the :post-indur-;trialists maintain ,

that scientific e.nd te chni cal elites will acquire power be

cause of the obj e ctive requirements of te chni cal rationality,

this represents nothing more than a pipe-dream.

Indeed ,

there is plenty of e mpiri cal evidence whi ch sugge sts that

s cientists and te chni cians are usually
subordinate
_,--··= to vari---·ous political intere sts . 1 0 Jean Meynaud concludes , tt Te ch""'==�,

___· --_..---,..---------

....

nocracy has not managed to gain a completely preponderant

control of government action in any contemporary regime , sup

posing that this is in fact the true wish of technicians. tt 1 1

In fact , if sp ecio lizati on i s as pronounced as is usually

claimed, its quite d ifficult to imagine a s ituation in which

the ind ividual expert, whose nvision 11 beyond hi s own spe cial. . .,_1, eu,
, m[--:...::, c e s po1 i· cy .
t y mus t o:r� ne ce s s i· ty b ,e __1 1m1

I t is even

h2.rder to envi sion a si tu2. t i on in which a group of ex.p erts

I
JI

I
f
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cooperro te sufficiently to do this .

Yet it has bee n argued

that tl-iin type of collegial decision-c:J aking will become in-

crea.singly prevalent, becaus e ra p id �;ocio-economic change ne

ce�sitates temporary, ad hoc respons es to specific problems .

This requires that men of widely diverse backgrounds b e re
peatedly brought together to deal with these problems. 1 2_ ·

But it is precisely because these people are dealing with

quite specific problems that leads one to believe that the

generality of their influence is rather limited .

This is exp ressed very cl early in Anthony Giddens ' no

tion of "issue-strength" , which refers to the ra.nge of is

sues over which various types of elite s c�1n e xercize authori
ty.

While it is undeniable true that speci.:::.lists impose li

mitations upon the competence of policy decisions taken by

the political e lite ( i. e. , upon the means to achieve _a given

end ) ,

s peciclization itself irnnos e s restrictions upon the

"issue-strength" of e xperts , leaving effective power in the

hands of non-speci2.lists . 1 3

Following Galbraith , we might c c::::i.

concede that the authority which specit,lists exercize ·within
their particular fields grants them a large d egree of auto

nomy with respect to the organizational line of a.uthority.
But this is not the same thing as having the capacity to

shape overall policy.

All of this cf course sugge sts the logical validity of

Horkheimer ' s c onclusions.

When he s ays that reason has be

come t'harne ssed to the social process tr , this is based in
part

u-;1 cm

his recog :ci ti on that there is no parti cu 7 ar end
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which [a:i.b j ective re ason (i. e. technical means) "must" serve .
But it is c2.lso ba.s ed upon the fact that ther e are no longer

any st;c.nd ards by which the acceptc1bility of' various e nds cF: n

be defi�itively judged .

Writers such as Habermas and Alvin

G ouldner have seiz ed on this fact to attack technocracy ( and

by extension P qst-indu1:1trialism) as being

1

t

id_eological:.!! .

The problem with technocracy, according to the s e theorists,

is that it sees itself as containing a rationality which

transcends all subj ective interests, politics, and conflict ,

when in fact it is nothing more than the unreflexive ideolo
gy of a power-hungry class of technici ans who are totally
subordinate to the powers the.t be .

Gouldner remarks that • • •

• • • the c.c tu2_l structural subordin2,tion of technic2.l
ratiorn:di ty to ma.nagerial power and economic inter
ests is occluded by the ideology of the new tech
nology. The technologists ' wish-fulfilling fanta
uy of be ing free from the control of pure ly politi
cal, economic, military , or banking interests is a
tecLnological ideology, a proj ect mistakenly defined
as an already achieved condition . 1 4

Gouldner's point is Fell-tc:;ken , but the problem is that he

tends to assume that the characteristic goals and biases of
technocratic thou�ht do not exist apart from technocracy es

a pol itic8_l ideology .

This is simply not the case .

We he.ve seen that a d-e sire for political order e nd ma

terial ,::: bund.ance sre chcrecter i stic of technocratic thou5ht.

Now , t} e2 e :-' re ty no mc c,ns goc_ls which are in eny way unique
1

to techr:ocr;:� cy .

Political theorists of every persuasion have

at one time or anot2:ler c oncerned themselve s with both goals .

What is striking about technocratic theory is that these

x

Ir

r

I

I

II

I
It
i
t
I

J
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goals appear in isolation; a reading of Saint-Simon, for ex
ample, lea.v e s one with the impression that nothing else is
necessary .

However, such a conception mak es much more sense

if one views it as a r2 sponse to value-�el atiyj sm .
situation in which ,,,;rord s such as

11

Given a

oueht" and "value 0 are de

nounced as illusions, it s eems to me that there will be a

tendency to accept these goals as the only legitimate one s .
I should point out that I am Q.Q.i claiming that this

is in any sense logically "neces s ary".

For one thing, it is

clear that such a tendency is mitigated to the extent that

traditional philosophies, faiths and world-views per s ist .

What I ,rug_ arguing is that in a 1,rorld without abs olilte val.

ues, people will be more inclined to a ccept " commodious ll�i
ving" and political order as legitimate in and of themselves
for lack of anything d emonstrably better .

Of course, an ex

tremely potent tool, the scientific method, is available

for us to achieve these goals .

But as we have seen, there

are now n o: longer any obj ectively valid restraints which
can be placed on its use.

of thi s ?

What are the likely consequences

We noted that the justification for science as a n acti

vity doe s not have to rest upon the assumption that it allows
us to discover truths about the natural or social world

which are independ ent of the observer .

However, as Re inhard

Bendix points out, » sc ienti sts do believe in an ordering of
s ociety which is not m 2..n -made .

This be1:i. ef is a nece ssary

precondition of any attempt to arrive at scientific

-e2-

· generaJ.i zatic.ns in the study of human affairs. n 1 5

Conse

quently , science will proceed on this assumption, and the

past successes of science can only lend support to this ap

proach .

In other words, the scientific method presupposes

that all factors are relat�n some way , fJnd that in theo
ry nothing is unexplainable".'./ uExplanation tt , in bothe the

natural and social sciences, can cons ist of no more than var-

ious theories which postulate statistically significant in

terrelationships am.ong various factors , which are then tested .

Realize that the ongoing assumption of an "ord er 0 here in

volves only the notion that all factors are in some way con

nected with other factors; there is no ttmeaning" in any of --t: ::: �::'
this .

What is disturbing to me, however, is that total expla

nation requires total control.

The nature of scientific ex

planation, regardless of whether its account of the world i s

understood to be objectively true , is inherently technological .

Method involves the breaking down of the seemingly complex na
tural and social world into its simpler element.s.

This is

why the ongoing assumption of an orderly universe gives one

power to act in the world. '1' ·-•

If a thing can be broken down

into its constituent elements, in theory it can be remade ,

perhaps into soE1ething which will help bring about

ous living 11 •
is power 0 •

tt

c om.In oo..., i• - .

This exp1ains Bewon's faiuous slogan , "lcnowledge

To know h ow something works is to be able to

� s rn:1ething .

Cons e quent ly, factors which cc,nnot be ex-

plained by de fidition carmot be ccntrolled .

"·I

I

Contribution

to t he
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b od y

of science, then, requir e s ins tituting th at

state of unity in which all pRrticulars ore truly · related.

Given a situation in which values themselves 2.re uphenomena"

which are t heoret ic2,lly explainable, nothins; can be exclude d

as a subj ect o f c ontrol .

Ni1tt z; phe was the first to fully
..

comprehend and accept the logic of this . 1 6 Nature ( i . e .
'-.,_ /'

truth ) has no value apart from our ability to manipulate i t
t o insure survival.

total understanding.

And survival requires total control,

Science, according to Henry S . Kariel • • •

•• • recognizes ( 1 ) tha.t the end for man is quite li
terally his end��his death, and ( 2 ) that the end for
science is the assuring of survival, the maintain
ing of the social End the individual equ.illibrium..
Hence, the purpose of science is to keep everything
endle ssl v moving . Its credentials are furnished by
its power tomake society survive; and as so ciety'.: js
in fa.ct kept forward ;a:nd on the move--wi thout hit
ches , deviation� , or backtalk-its credentials are
authenticated. 1 ·1

d

Again, I want to emphasize that this in no sense means

that some kind of amoral technocratic power state is " inevi

table" , or even very likely.

After all , scientists have

their corntnitm.ents , not the least of -which is a c ominitm-ent to
a political system which sustains the activity of science.

And scientists who publicly accept the implications of value

relativism for their discipline, such as B . F . Skinner, are

often regarded w�: th c ontempt in the scientific community .
But :the problem

s till remains .

Any commitment which scie!).c e

might lw.ve to a certa.in rr nt o f values is due perh2.ps to a .
sentimentali sm which derives from older traditions.

I n any

case, i t is certs.j_ nly not a product of the assumpt i ons basic

to scientific inquiry.
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To the · extent, then, that science assumes increasing

importance in a society-+there can certainly be no doubt

about this for our society, as the post-industrialists have

s hown--there will be a tendency for it to strip away any pos

sible grounds upon which its activity might be limited .

But

total control does not require a rigid, cruel authoritarian
ism .

" Co:nmodious living" is really based upon harmonizing

the ideal with the real .

"Co:nmodious living" might just as

well be translated into " happiness" or "satisfaction" , c 1rhich
ia .:.probably '· more in keeping with ·an age in which material

abund ance cannot be provided for all .

Man must instead be

ma.de to Tealize th.rlt a calm , stable r;:;atisfaction corresponds
with his true interests.

Desires must be tampe red with , and

if it is shown to be biologically nece ssay, outlets must be

arr2nged for the e xpression of anger, hatred, and possibly

outricht viole nce ,,

The nece :.r nity of mo.k ing agonizing choi

ces mue:. t 1)e elim5 nated, since this necessity is the cause of
a.ll social and political inste,bility.

Of course, the attempt to bring about a.n order such as

this would in all likel�hood fail miserably .

But the point

is that thc.� willingne ss to surrender all of our conceptions

of a truly meaningful existence f or the s.?Jc e of the sensation

o f happiness c2,n only incre��se .

T echnocra,cy is an ideology

' •
i
l
t'nis
. vi. ew.
e spouse s preci• se_y
w�ictl

And the fact that it

nersi sts in the form o:t' p ost-L1d ustri2,lism is a disturbing
J.

fact, ind eed .
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